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Introduction
What is the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web? Is it an 
open and distributed hypermedia system? Universal information space? 
How does the Web differ from the Internet? While the larger ecology of 
the Web has known many a revolution, its underlying architecture in 
contrast remains fairly stable. URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers), pro-
tocols like HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol), and languages such as 
HTML (HyperText Markup Language) have constituted the carefully 
evolved building blocks of the Web for more than two decades. As the 
particular kind of computing embodied by the Web has displaced tradi-
tional proprietary client-side applications, the foundations of Web archi-
tecture and its relationship to wider computing needs to be clarified in 
order to determine the Web’s roots and boundaries, as well as the histori-
cal reasons for its success and future developments. Crafting a philosophy 
of the Web is especially urgent, as debate is now opening over the relation-
ship of the Web to platform computing on mobile devices and cloud 
computing.
The scope of the questions that the philosophy of the Web provokes is 
quite wide-ranging. These questions begin with the larger metaphilosophi-
cal issue of whether or not there are unifying principles underlying the 
architecture of the Web that justify the existence of a philosophy of the 
Web. Tim Berners-Lee, widely acclaimed as the inventor of the Web, has 
developed in his design notes various informal reflections over the central 
role of URIs (Uniform Resource Identifiers, previously Locators) as a 
universal naming system, a central topic in philosophy since at least the 
pioneering works of Barcan Marcus. URIs such as http://www.example.org/ 
identify anything on the Web, so the Web itself can be considered the 
space of all URIs. Thus, in brief, we would say that there is indeed at least 
one unifying principle to the architecture of the Web, that of URIs. The 
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various architects of the Web, including Berners-Lee, made a number of 
critical design choices, such as creating a protocol-independent universal 
naming scheme in the form of URIs as well as other less well-known deci-
sions, such as allowing links to URIs to not resolve (leading to the infa-
mous “404 Not Found Message,” a feature not allowed in previous 
hypertext systems) that—little to the knowledge of everyday users of the 
Web—do form a coherent system, albeit one that has not yet been expli-
cated through a distinctively philosophical lens.
A critic could easily respond that there is no a priori reason any par-
ticular technology deserves its own philosophy. After all, there is no 
philosophy of automobiles or thermostats. Why would one privilege a 
philosophy of the Web over a philosophy of the Internet? These questions 
can be answered by looking at the nature of the design choices made in 
the formation of the Web: namely, in so far as the Web is based on URIs, 
the architecture of the Web exists on the level of naming and meaning, 
both of which are central to semantics and so are traditionally within the 
purview of philosophy. What the Web adds to the traditional philosophi-
cal study of natural language is both the technically engineered feat of a 
universalizing naming scheme in the form of URIs and the fact that such 
names can be accessed to return concrete bits and bytes, a distinctive 
feature of naming on the Web. However, the Web itself is agnostic over 
how the concrete low-level bits that compose something like a web page 
are transmitted across the network in response to an access request to a 
URI, as this is determined by protocols such as the Internet’s TCP/IP 
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). Thus, the Web can be 
considered an abstract information space of names above the networking 
protocol layer, up to the point that it could have been (or could still be) 
built on top of another networking protocol layer (such as OSI [Open 
Systems Interconnection] or the “Future Internet”). Likewise, the Internet 
can also host applications other than the Web that do not use URIs, 
such as peer-to-peer file sharing or the Web’s early rivals (the Gopher 
system, for instance). So in response to our critic, the Web does have its 
own architecture, and—unlike the case with automobiles and even the 
Internet—this architecture uncontroversially deals with philosophical 
concepts of naming and meaning, and this justifies the existence of a 
philosophy of the Web, at least insofar as names and meaning on the Web 
differ from natural language (or the philosophical way to conceptualize 
it!), a topic worthy of further exploration (Monnin 2012a).
The Web is not all protocols and naming schemes; it is also a wide-
ranging transformation of our relationship to the wider world “out there,” 
to the ontology of the world itself. It is precisely this engineering aspect 
that makes the philosophy of the Web differ qualitatively from traditional 
philosophy of language, where it has been assumed that natural language 
is (at least for philosophical purposes) stable and hence “natural.” In 
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contrast, the nature of the growth of both the Web and digital technolo-
gies undoubtedly calls into question the contemporary transformation of 
our entire form of life. Bringing scrutiny to bear on Wittgenstein’s natu-
ralistic concept of the “form of life,” American sociologist Scott Lash 
takes into account the anthropological upheaval caused by the evolution 
of various mediums of thought on our technological forms of life (Lash 
2002), a subject that has been abundantly discussed in the context of the 
Web (Halpin, Clark, and Wheeler 2014). Our main focus here, however, 
is less the future of humanity than that of philosophical research and 
philosophy itself. The architecture of the Web reveals a process of continu-
ation and regrasping (which precisely needs to be properly assessed) of 
the most central of philosophical concepts: object, proper name, and 
ontology. On the Web, each concept of philosophy in its own way then 
gains a new existence as a technical artifact: objects turn into resources, 
proper names into URIs, ontology into Semantic Web ontologies.
Such a transition from philosophical concepts to technical objects isn’t 
a one-way process and cannot remain without consequences for the origi-
nal concepts that have been uprooted from their normal context, and 
accordingly this transition warrants careful examination. Do we philoso-
phize today as we did in the past? With the same subject matter? Or in the 
same manner? Does it still make sense to locate oneself within established 
traditions, such as phenomenology and analytic philosophy, when their 
very own concepts freely cross these boundaries, and the real conversation 
is taken up elsewhere, using a language that only superficially seems identi-
cal to the one that preceded it? These kinds of questions have always been 
central to metaphilosophy, yet the advent of the Web—and so the phi-
losophy of the Web—brings to these questions both a certain renewed 
importance and impetus. In the essays collected here, we bring together 
a number of authors who have offered some key contributions to this 
initial foray into the tentative realm of the philosophy of the Web. In order 
to guide philosophers through this nascent philosophical field, in the next 
section we delve deeper into the philosophical role of URIs and engineer-
ing as these two subjects serve as the twin foundations of the philosophy 
of the Web, and we then put each of the contributions in this collection 
within its philosophical context before reaching some tentative conclu-
sions for next steps for the field.
1. URIs: “Artifactualization” of Proper Names
On the Web, the analogue of proper names is found in URIs, given by 
the standard IETF RFC 3986 to be “a simple and extensible means for 
identifying a resource,” a definition in which resources are left crucially 
underdefined to be “whatever might be identified by a URI” (Berners-Lee, 
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Fielding, and Masinter 2005). URIs are everywhere: everything from 
mailto:harry@w3.org (for identifying an e-mail address of Harry Halpin) 
to http://whitehouse.gov (for identifying the page about the White House) 
qualifies as a URI. What quickly becomes apparent is that URIs are kinds 
of proper names for objects on the Web.
During the past fifteen years, philosophical discussions around the 
notion of a proper name have seamlessly followed in a business-as-usual 
manner, without any significant breakthrough. Yet during that same 
period, the architects of the Web have taken hold of the idea of proper 
names, and without purposefully altering its definition, have made naming 
the first supporting pillar of the Web, thus formulating an answer to 
the ages-old question of the relationship between words and things by 
combining in an original—and unintentional!—fashion the thoughts of 
Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Kripke. For philosophy to take the 
URI, an engineered system of universal and accessible names, as a 
first-class philosophical citizen is then the first task of the philosophy 
of the Web.
While at first URIs may seem to be just a naming system for ordinary 
objects on the Web like e-mail addresses and web pages, the plan of 
Berners-Lee is to extend URIs as a naming scheme not just for the Web 
but for all reality—the Semantic Web will allow URIs to refer to liter-
ally anything, as “human beings, corporations, and bound books in a 
library can also be resources” (Berners-Lee, Fielding, and Masinter 2005). 
This totalizing vision of the Web is not without its own problems. In a 
striking debate between Berners-Lee and the well-known artificial intel-
ligence researcher Patrick Hayes over URIs and their capacity to uniquely 
“identify” resources beyond web pages, Berners-Lee held that engineers 
decide how the protocol should work and that these decisions should 
determine the constraints of reference and identity, while Hayes replied 
that names have their possible referents determined only as traditionally 
understood by formal semantics, which he held engineers could not 
change but only had to obey (Halpin 2011). This duality can be inter-
preted as an opposition between a material and a formal a priori. Inter-
estingly enough, recently, Hayes and other logicians such as Menzel have 
begun focusing on adopting principles from the Web into logical seman-
tics itself, creating new kinds of logic for the Web (Menzel 2011). Unlike 
philosophical systems that reflect on the constraints of the world, the 
Web is a world-wide embodied technical artifact that therefore creates 
a whole new set of constraints. We suggest that they should be under-
stood as a material a priori—in the Husserlian sense—grounded in history 
and technology.
Thus the Web, when it comes to its standards, breaks free from French 
philosopher Jules Vuillemin’s definition of a philosophical system as built 
on the logical contradictions between major philosophical schools of 
thought (Vuillemin 2009). Yet the Web doesn’t lead either to the collapse 
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of the transcendental and the ontological into the empirical, a new kind 
of “technological monism” as suggested by Lash (2002). Logical contradic-
tion is overcome not by factual opposition (two words that Vuillemin 
highlighted) but through an artifactual composition, associating through 
the mediation of the artifact the virtues of competing philosophical posi-
tions. As the functions of concepts become functionalities, it is becoming 
increasingly easier to make them coexist for the sake of a tertium datur, 
without having to give up on consistency (Sloterdijk 2001).
The material a priori of technical systems such as the Web is brought 
about by what we call “artifactualization” (Monnin 2009), a process 
where concepts become “embodied” in materiality—with lasting conse-
quences, as the result trumps every expectation, being more than a mere 
projection of preexisting concepts (which would simply negate the minute 
details of the object considered). While such a process clearly predates the 
Web, we can from our present moment see within a single human lifetime 
the increasing speed at which it is taking place, and through which techni-
cal categories (often rooted in philosophical ones) are becoming increas-
ingly dominant over their previously unquestioned “natural” and “logical” 
counterparts. At the same time, the process of having philosophical ideas 
take a concrete form via technology lends to them often radically new 
characteristics, transforming these very concepts in the process. Heidegger 
posited a filiation between technology and metaphysics, with technology 
realizing the Western metaphysical project by virtue of technology inscrib-
ing its categories directly into concrete matter. Yet if technology is 
grounded in metaphysics, it is not the result of a metaphysical movement 
or “destiny” (Schicksals), but a more mundane contingent historical 
process, full of surprises and novelties. For all these reasons, it must be 
acknowledged that the genealogy of the Web, as a digital information 
system, differs from traditional computation with regard both to the con-
cepts at stake and to our relation to them. The scientific ethos is indeed 
being replaced by an engineering one, something Berners-Lee dubbed 
“philosophical engineering” (Halpin 2008)—and this difference even 
holds true with regard to the (mainly logical, thanks to the Curry-Howard 
correspondence) ethos of computer science itself.
As already mentioned, URIs form the principal pillar of Web architec-
ture, so it shouldn’t be surprising that they also constitute our gateway 
into the aforementioned problematic between engineering and philoso-
phy. From its inception, the Web was conceived as a space of names, or 
“namespace,” even if the historical journey to URIs led through a verita-
ble waltz of hesitations as the engineers who built the Web tried to pin 
down standardized definitions to various naming schemes. The numerous 
Web and Internet standards around various kinds of names bear witness 
to that ambivalence: URL (Uniform Resource Locator), URN (Uniform 
Resource Name), and even URC (Uniform Resource Characteristic or 
Citation). Each of these acronyms matches a different conception of the 
6 ALEXANDRE MONNIN AND HARRY HALPIN
Web and modifies the way it constitutes a system. Eventually, the acro-
nyms have slowly evolved over time to return to Berners-Lee’s original 
vision of a URI: a “Universal” Resource Identifier for everything, from 
which follows naturally the ability of links to allow everything to be inter-
connected on the Web.
The notion of proper name as it prevails today is directly inherited 
from analytic philosophy, and more precisely, from the work of Saul 
Kripke; although other definitions may exist in philosophy, Ruth Barcan 
Marcus (Humphreys and Fetzer 1998) is clearly the one who launched 
this Kripkean tradition, and this strand of work eventually meant that 
“proper name” would become the key operating term for questions on 
reference, identity, and modality. It holds such a weight that it explains 
how fields as diverse as epistemology and ontology can be considered 
part of a larger story, that of a science of reference. This space of con-
vergence was historically opened by the different theories of intentionality 
and objects from Brentano to Twardowski and Meinong, but it was to 
split post-Frege philosophy into two rival traditions, the analytical and 
the phenomenological—the latter sometimes considered “continental” 
from the analytical perspective (Benoist 2001). Ruth Barcan Marcus and 
Saul Kripke’s works on proper names provide the apex for the analytic 
tradition, but what we see now on the Web is the URI as a proper name 
and technical object that reopens a space for reunification of these two 
divergent philosophical traditions within the philosophy of the Web as 
the problems around reference and naming migrate from philosophical 
systems (Vuillemin 2009)—in particular, the philosophy of language—
toward technical and artifactual systems, asking for a complete shift of 
analysis.
A clear example of how URIs are transforming the analytic tradition’s 
bedrock of logic has recently been pioneered by Patrick Hayes, known for 
his original quest to formalize common-sense knowledge in terms of first-
order logic of artificial intelligence but also more recently deeply involved 
for several years in the development of the Semantic Web, the extension 
of the Web beyond documents into a generic knowledge representation 
language (Hayes 1979). As a logical foundation for the Semantic Web, 
Hayes has suggested the creation of “Blogic” (a contraction of “WeB 
logic,” inspired by a similar contraction of “Web logs” to “blogs”), in 
which logical proper names, which possess no signification of their own 
outside their formally defined role in logic, would be replaced by derefer-
enceable URIs, which could in turn dereference logical sentences or even 
new interpretation functions not present in their original context.1 Blogic 
would leverage the ability to use a name—in this case, a URI—to retrieve 
a “document,” functionality that has played a critical part in the Web’s 
1 See the talk “Blogic or Now What’s in a Link?” by Patrick Hayes, online at http://
videolectures.net/iswc09_hayes_blogic/.
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success to this day, but outside hypertext and in the realm of semantics. 
With access mechanisms then possibly defining the semantics of proper 
names, the notion of reference on the Web cannot clearly choose between 
Wittgenstein (meaning determined by use), Russell (definite descriptions), 
and Kripke (rigid designators) for a theory of meaning. As a framework, 
the architecture of the Web composes with these conceptual positions: a 
user is free to give any kind of meaning to a URI, someone publishing a 
new URI may refer to it rigidly or with the help of a description for the 
Semantic Web, and what we access via that URI can also play a role in 
defining its meaning.
This mixture of the technical and the philosophical is found not only 
in the semantics of URIs but also in their governance (the latter having 
an impact on the former). URIs are not just free-floating names but 
assigned virtual territory controlled by bodies such as the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) via domain registrars. While being proper 
names, URIs also have a particular legal and commercial status that does 
not clearly compare to proper names in philosophy, with perhaps only a 
vague analogue to the ability of organizations to copyright names. For 
websites, controlling a name, and thus which web pages can be accessed 
from it, is a source of immense power. According to Tim Berners-Lee, the 
ability to mint new URIs and link them with any other URI constitutes 
not only an essential linguistic function but also a fundamental freedom. 
Yet as URIs leave the field of semiotics, they undergo a change in nature 
as regards both the possibilities offered by a technology of naming and 
the limitations imposed by the legislation that governs bodies such as 
IANA. Once again, objects such as URIs or disciplines such as philosophy 
that seemed purely formal are gaining a newly found materiality, full of 
historical and even political contingencies around extremely concrete 
juridical and economic issues.
2. Denaturalizing Ontology: Philosophical Activity Redux
Another field in which the Web is rapidly causing massive conceptual 
tremors is the once forgotten philosophical realm of ontology. Given the 
long-lasting gap between a name and its object, the study of URIs on the 
Web naturally causes an intrepid philosopher of the Web to lean on work 
on names in philosophy of language, while with the study of ontology on 
the Web we return to the preponderance of the object. Generally consid-
ered a branch of metaphysics, ontology traditionally has generally been 
the study of the (often possible) existence of objects and their fundamental 
categorization and distinctions. Interestingly enough, engineering-inclined 
artificial intelligence researchers (the late John McCarthy being first 
among them) have also seized upon the word “ontology” over the past 
fifty years, making “ontology” their own term for purposes of creating 
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knowledge representation languages, as exemplified by Gruber’s famous 
engineering definition that “an ontology is a specification of a conceptu-
alization” (Gruber 1993). While this definition may at first glance seem so 
vague to be totally useless, one should remember that Tim Berners-Lee 
also had notorious trouble defining precisely what a URI is, and this did 
not seem to prevent URIs from becoming central to the entire edifice of 
the Web. In fact, one would almost suspect that the utility of a term may 
somehow be related to the fact that it is underdefined—or perhaps more 
precisely, defined just enough to allow concrete engineering to reveal the 
inherent productivity of the term’s concept. While the use of ontology by 
knowledge representation has become sidelined in philosophical circles by 
more clearly philosophical debates in artificial intelligence around embod-
iment, the move of Berners-Lee to create a Semantic Web that transforms 
the Web from a space of URIs for hypertext documents to a giant global 
knowledge representation language built on URIs has led to a renewal of 
interest in the engineering of ontologies as well. We suspect this compu-
tational turn in ontologies on the Web will in turn lead to a revival of the 
philosophical field of ontology.
As the shift from philosophical ontology to ontological engineering 
progresses, philosophers are gradually losing control over their own tools, 
even if they are not necessarily aware of it. What ensues is a real “prole-
tarianization,” as Bernard Stiegler (1998) puts it, and this process is 
smooth and passive, since philosophical activity goes on uninterrupted, 
as if nothing were amiss. Nonetheless, there are a number of unmistakable 
signs. Following the example of Barry Smith, some philosophers have 
already made their move explicit by rebranding themselves ontologists, as 
they are now working exclusively in the field of knowledge engineering. 
Might the conundrum of this technological life form be all about employ-
ing the concepts of philosophy in a new light while at the same time 
making the previous blissfully technologically unaware philosophical dis-
cipline obsolete? Although there are possibly some examples to illustrate 
such a strong point, a more reasonable response would be to answer this 
question with a little more subtlety by taking into account the precise 
nature of how the Web transforms ontology before tackling the wider 
question of how the Web transforms philosophy.
The ontological implications of the Web are deeply related to the 
concept of a resource harbored at the heart of Web architecture; for the 
philosophy of the Web this particular concept constitutes an opportunity 
to renew the question of ontology itself. As designated by a URI, a 
resource can be “anything at all,” exactly as was the case for the hoary 
philosophical concept of the “object,” which was the actual focus of the 
ontological tradition (as long as you trace the word back to its origins in 
the seventeenth century, more than twenty centuries after Aristotle’s defi-
nition of the science of being). Consequently, it is not the sole business of 
philosophers, hidden far from the world at the back of some unidentified 
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abode where they can hone their weapons alone to issue judgments and 
decide what “anything at all” really means. Everywhere, the gap is nar-
rowing and the old privileges are in crisis, as Scott Lash (2002) has dis-
cussed. The new indexing tools and the contributive nature of the Web 
make it possible for anyone to tackle this issue—not only philosophers 
and engineers. Thus, the way in which the question will be asked relies on 
the Web itself. Nevertheless, in opposition to Lash’s thesis, ontology is 
not suffering from being conditioned by the patterns of our technological 
way of living. Technology is the condition of the liberation of ontology, 
the “ontogonic” dimension of technology discussed by Bruno Bachimont 
(2010) and more recently with regard to the notion of philosophical engi-
neering in Monnin (2012b) that draws on Pierre Livet’s work presented 
in this collection (Livet 2014).
According to Livet’s recent work on the ontology of the Web, we can 
chart the operations that allowed the emergence of the objects that in 
turn proved essential to conceptualize the Web’s architecture and, subse-
quently, to clear the ontological horizon (Livet 2014). Far from consisting 
merely of epistemic processes, this work opens the door for an ontology 
of operations constitutive of an ontology of entities, which bit by bit 
refines itself as time goes by. The possibility to move back and forth, as 
the whole process unfurls, is not to be excluded, leading to new beginnings 
and thus leaving entirely open the question of the nature of the ultimate 
constituents of our technological cosmos.
Given the conceptual purity required by formal ontology, built as it is 
upon relationships of dependency and the application of mereology, and 
the materiality of devices as the place of a new technicized a priori, the 
time has come for a re-evaluation of the very notions of form and matter, 
through the filter of digital technologies in general and the Web in par-
ticular. In this regard, the research initiated several years ago on Ontology 
Design Patterns (Gangemi and Presutti 2009), which may appear to be 
limited only to the field of knowledge engineering, in fact has implications 
far beyond the boundaries of its original field. Incidentally, nothing pre-
vents philosophers from trying to conceive their practice in a more col-
laborative fashion using a similar pattern analysis of their own activity, 
in order to gain a better view on the collective fine-grained ontological 
invariants that groups of philosophers share beyond the explicit debates 
through which philosophers normally distinguish themselves. Beyond 
this, the background against which these ontological patterns appear is 
formed by practices that, though they may produce certain apparently 
transhistorical regularities, are rooted in an historical context and there-
fore should not be “naturalized” prematurely.
In order to identify and qualify these invariants by taking into account 
that which supports and maintains them, one has to, so to speak, “denatu-
ralize ontology”—and this slogan could serve as a synthesis of the entire 
philosophical research program we are suggesting here. To pretend, as is 
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often the case in analytic philosophy, that certain ontological construc-
tions are simply pregiven would be a serious error, for everything has a 
cost—one need only consider the works of Bruno Latour and Pierre Livet 
to realize that (Latour 2001; Livet 2014). The key is determining how 
technology opens an avenue into the historicization of ontology.
There are clear predecessors in either explicitly or implicitly building 
ontologies into technology as well as having technology influence our 
everyday ontology. In the fields of cognitive science and artificial intelli-
gence, the question of the representation, formalization, and computation 
of knowledge—as well as the more philosophically neglected approaches 
centered on collective intelligence and human computation that partially 
go beyond traditional philosophy of the mind due to their focus on human 
intelligence’s complementarity with the machine—have already produced 
interesting leads in the wake of the work of Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers on what they call “the Extended Mind Hypothesis” (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998). We would like to extend the extended mind by renewing 
metaphysics through a focus on the positive aspect of French linguist and 
semiotician François Rastier’s critique of cognitive science, which he 
accused of “naturalizing metaphysics” (Rastier 2001).2 Given the lessons 
learned from the implicit metaphysics of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, we cannot simply criticize or reject the ongoing exploitation 
of the Web on an unprecedented scale that harnesses vast resources of 
centuries of philosophical debates on language and knowledge. In order 
to describe the paramount importance of the technical production of 
media ranging from television to computers in the twentieth century, 
Bernard Stiegler (1998) coined the expression “the machinic turning-point 
of sensibility.” With a slight shift of focus, we may talk of a machinic (or 
perhaps better, artifactual) turning-point of metaphysics itself, an ongoing 
deep modification of the meaning of metaphysics in philosophy.
At the present moment, the perspective given by the original architec-
ture of the Web needs to be broadened as two problematics currently 
intersect: (a) the artificialization of a growing number of particular domains 
(“natural” but also “formal” ones,3 each of these two notions being tra-
ditionally contrasted with technics but now becoming technical) and (b) 
the artifactualization of philosophical concepts in general as they are 
imported into the realm of the digital—in particular under the guise of 
3 The origin of this paradox could be found in Husserl’s work, in which formal and mate-
rial a prioris and ontologies are articulated. As always, this is only a starting point, and this 
distinction is likely to be taken up and revised by other currents of thought. We think about 
material cultures or authors whose works, although they differ in many ways, all put the 
stress on the materiality of the mediums and operations of knowledge.
2 Of course, one of the necessary conditions to be spared the risk of unduly naturalizing 
metaphysics is to make sure that no kind of prophetic and biologically inclined conception 
of technology is allowed to thrive in parallel.
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the dominant sociotechnical form of the twenty-first century, which is 
none other than the Web. It may even be argued that semiotic objects, 
such as philosophical concepts, already have features similar to those of 
technical objects (Halpin 2008),4 in which case this latest round of digitiza-
tion on the Web may rather appear tantamount to a re-artifactualization, 
provided that we do not ignore the (often overlooked) original ties of 
philosophy to technology.
Behind the distinction between the two aforementioned problematics 
stands an important issue: if these two dimensions are not clearly acknowl-
edged, there is a risk that we will “naturalize” (a) without any real philo-
sophical scrutiny the re-introduction (b) of some body of philosophical 
knowledge (or some unconscious philosophical legacy) while designing 
technical systems.5 For all these reasons, the very practice of philosophy is 
transformed by having to take the material a priori and its technical cate-
gories as seriously as “natural” (synthetic) or “analytic” categories from 
biology or natural language. Philosophers then have to deal with engi-
neered categories that may have a lasting effect in domains like the Web, 
not just as variants of categories that can be analytically understood but 
rather as concrete artifacts that can even transform analytic categories 
previously taken for granted. Ironically, the main challenge to analytic 
judgment is no longer what Quine called naturalization, but rather the 
ongoing artifactualization of which the Web is the historical exemplar par 
excellence (Livet 2014; Monnin 2013).
3. Open Problems of the Philosophy of the Web
Now that we have surveyed some of the core foundations of the nascent 
philosophy of the Web, we should be clear that we have only started to 
embark on this particular route, and the road ahead lies littered with open 
philosophical problems worthy of a tassel of theses. The Web was the 
brainchild not of Tim Berners-Lee as a lone individual but of a large and 
heterogeneous group of Web architects, ranging from Berners-Lee’s com-
patriots involved in standards, such as Larry Masinter and Roy Fielding 
(Berners-Lee, Fielding, and Masinter 2005), to users who contribute 
5 In this view, the warning is also useful against all ways of thinking that proceed step by 
step (two steps, to be precise), “computationalizing” or “informationalizing” the world first, 
in order to be subsequently entirely free to naturalize ontology, which is afterward consid-
ered a natural science of the universe (a tendency that historically dates back to the Neopla-
tonic philosophers). Opposing this way of thinking, Jean-Gabriel Ganascia advocates a 
computerized epistemology that is directly related to the cultural sciences, an epistemology 
that is well aware of the status of computers in the production of contemporary knowledge. 
In this respect, our point of view is quite close to his (Ganascia 2008).
4 On the articulation of semiotic and technical aspects, see also the work of Bruno 
Bachimont (2010).
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content daily to the Web; the philosophy of the Web must likewise be a 
collective affair. We will provide brief summaries of some of the most 
pressing questions that face the philosophy of the Web, along with an 
overview of those contributors in this collection who have addressed them.
3.1. What Is the Relationship of the Philosophy of  
the Web to a More General Philosophy?
It goes almost without saying that every new discipline must build its 
foundations on earlier philosophical studies and situate itself consciously 
within a wider historical context, yet to do this correctly is one of the most 
difficult tasks for a philosopher. Case in point: one of the factors distin-
guishing the Web from earlier visions of an interconnected global infor-
mation space, such as Vannevar Bush’s Memex (Bush 1945), is that the 
Web is implemented on digital computers. This simple decision to stick 
to a digital medium had a deep impact on engineering matters, allowing 
as it does functionality from the copying and caching of pages used by 
search engines to the transformation of music and video by streaming 
media. Yet this almost obvious engineering decision in turn leads to a 
decidedly deep impact on metaphysical notions such as that of a resource 
(Berners-Lee, Fielding, and Masinter 2005). Yet in expanding the Web 
into the Semantic Web, where seemingly non-digital things are construed 
as resources, there still seems something self-evidently different between 
web pages and things themselves, as one can easily copy pages about the 
Eiffel Tower, due to their being digital, but not the Eiffel Tower itself. 
However, precisely explicating the philosophical difference between a 
page about the Eiffel Tower and the Eiffel Tower itself seems to always 
involve punting the question to an under-theorized notion of digitality. 
While there has been considerable philosophical debate over the nature 
of logic and computation, there has been little work on the wider notion 
of digitality. One of the prime tasks of the philosophy of the Web is to 
determine how the Web is engineered on top of robustly digital objects. 
This is not to say that the Web must remain digital forever—as the Web 
transforms into an Internet of Things and increasingly interacts with 
the analogue world, understanding digitality becomes more—not less!—
important, as does situating this digital turn within wider currents in the 
analytic and phenomenological traditions. Yuk Hui’s contribution “What 
Is a Digital Object?” provides a synopsis of his much larger foray into this 
field, and artfully combines Husserl’s phenomenology with Simondon’s 
understanding of technics to provide just such a theoretical foundation 
for the philosophy of the Web (Hui 2014).
3.2. Does the Web Radically Impact Metaphysics,  
Ontology, and Epistemology?
As we indicated earlier, it appears that the Web is having perhaps its 
most crucial role in philosophical realms that seem at first glance rather 
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distant from high-speed technology. Taking on board the efforts of the 
Semantic Web to rework the logical foundations of ontology, Monnin 
(2014) argues that the main innovation of the architecture of the Web 
is definitely more ontological than technical. Raising the question “What 
do Web identifiers refer to and how?” he examines the answer provided 
by Web architects themselves. The investigation, in a way, is reminiscent 
of Quine’s landmark paper “On What There Is,” once it has been brought 
to the Web. Monnin’s conclusion is that the Web articulates a deeply 
subtle view of objects on a global scale, theoretically as well as techni-
cally. In other words: the Web is an operative “ontology,” as suggested 
in the title of his piece. Pierre Livet demonstrates in his contribution 
“Web Ontologies as Renewal of Classical Philosophical Ontology” how 
far the Web has taken us from classical ontological questions based on 
“natural” kinds to new dynamic and open-ended ontologies (Livet 2014). 
On a similar note, without a doubt the Web seems to be impacting the 
phenomenology of such fundamental metaphysical categories as space 
and time for ordinary users. Michalis Vafopoulos’s contribution “Being, 
Space, and Time on the Web” is precisely such a retheorization of meta-
physics on the Web, taking such fundamental aspects of the Web as the 
number of links in a page and reconceiving of this as a concept of space, 
with the time spent by users visiting a given resource as a concept of 
time, and then drawing a number of social and economic conclusions 
(Vafopoulos 2014). Moving from the world itself to our knowledge of 
the world, we find that one of most interesting phenomena brought about 
by the Web is the tendency of people to increasingly rely on search 
engines to answer their everyday questions. Precisely how ubiquitously 
search engine usage impacts classical conceptions of epistemological ques-
tions of knowledge and belief are tackled in the piece by Thomas Simpson, 
“Evaluating Google as an Epistemic Tool” (Simpson 2014). These epis-
temological questions are also not purely theoretical, as obviously the 
use of search engines in everyday environments, political debate in wikis 
and (micro)blogs, and the possible transformation of the university system 
itself by massive Web-mediated online courses all merit serious attention, 
and how we understand these issues is directly influenced by our position 
on whether or not access to knowledge on the Web counts as belief or 
even knowledge.
3.3. Can Human Cognition and Intelligence Genuinely  
Be Extended by the Web?
Questions about epistemology naturally lead to questions about whether 
or not the Web is changing our conception of humanity, and to 
questions about how the philosophy of the Web interacts with other 
empirically informed philosophical questions around neuroscience and 
cognitive science. In particular, the question of whether or not human 
cognition is genuinely extended by the Web appears rather naturally: In 
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a not-so-distant common scenario when humans are wearing Google-
enabled goggles that allow them to almost instantly and seamlessly access 
the Web, would one give the Web some of the cognitive credit for problem 
solving? This very example, in terms of a special pair of glasses rotating 
blocks in the classic game of Tetris, is brought up as one of the moti-
vating examples of the classic Extended Mind Hypothesis of Chalmers 
and Clark (Clark and Chalmers 1998), and now this example is coming 
very close to reality on the Web. However, the precise conditions of 
what constitutes the mark of the cognitive, and under what conditions 
the Web actually counts as part of an extended mind, are still very much 
a topic of debate. The first essay in this collection, “Philosophy of the 
Web: Representation, Enaction, Collective Intelligence,” outlines con-
nections between the philosophy of the Web and what has been termed 
“ ‘4E’ (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognition (Halpin, 
Clark, and Wheeler 2014). In this overview, Halpin, Clark, and Wheeler 
note how concepts from cognitive science such as representation and 
enaction must be re-thought through in the light of the Web’s status as 
a readily accessible externalized public cognitive resource. They end with 
broaching the topic of how the Web brings forth the possibility of not 
just an extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998) but also a new type 
of massively distributed collective intelligence that has yet to be properly 
studied via the lens of philosophy. In his contribution, “The Web-
Extended Mind,” Paul Smart mounts an argument for why the Web 
should be considered part of the extended mind, and then proceeds to 
show how engineering developments such as Berners-Lee’s Semantic Web 
may have certain design characteristics that could more tightly bind the 
mind to the Web in the future (Smart 2014). This naturally implies 
revisiting the question of intelligence. Interestingly enough, in the early 
days of the Internet, the motivating vision was one of collective intel-
ligence, in which machines augmented rather than replaced human intel-
ligence. This vision was a direct rival of artificial intelligence, which 
hoped to implement human-level intelligence in machines. Surprisingly, 
a thorough investigation of the philosophical assumptions and differences 
of both collective and artificial intelligence has yet to be written, an 
investigation that has become increasingly urgent, as the Semantic Web 
itself is often criticized as a mere repeat of classical artificial intelligence. 
A first important step has been taken by Selmer Bringsjord and Naveen 
Sundar Govindarajulu in their contribution “Given the Web, What Is 
Intelligence, Really?” in which they convincingly argue that even if the 
Semantic Web did become a reality, it would lack the reasoning capacity 
of humans that intelligence requires (Bringsjord and Govindarajulu 2014). 
How this particular debate over the transformation of intelligence on 
the Web plays out in the future will no doubt have yet unforeseen 
ramifications, just as the original quest for artificial intelligence radically 
revised the traditional pre-computational philosophy of the mind.
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3.4. Does the Web Alter Our Domain-Specific Practices in a Manner 
That Demands a New Qualitative Analysis?
Given our order of presentation, one of the central questions of the phi-
losophy of the Web would seem to be how the new engineering-inspired 
revolution in the rarefied air of philosophy will have its tremors felt in 
various specialized domains. Quite the reverse seems true: the impact of 
the Web has most powerfully been noticed in its empirical effects on 
almost impossibly heterogeneous domains, ranging from online recom-
mendation systems in e-commerce to the near instantaneous spread of 
news globally via microblogging. Indeed, the primary difficulty of the 
philosophy of the Web lies precisely in the difficulty inherent in tracing 
how such a diverse range of complex induced effects could form a coherent 
philosophical system, one that may have explanatory and even predictive 
power. Thus, detailed domain-specific studies of how the Web impacts 
particular domains of practice are critically part of the philosophy of the 
Web. Few areas can be considered seemingly more remote from mundane 
engineering considerations than proof-proving in mathematics, yet in 
their remarkable contribution, “The Web as a Tool for Proving,” Petros 
Stefaneas and Ioannis Vandoulakis demonstrate the nature of the radical 
impact of the Web on this most formal and theoretical of domains 
(Stefaneas and Vandoulakis 2014). To move in the reverse direction, the 
communication and ubiquitous accessibility of the Web may alter our 
notion of embodiment. Nowhere is this more powerfully demonstrated 
than in the multiplayer Web-mediated virtual worlds, whose numbers 
seem to be growing everyday. While currently only a small part of the 
Web, it is very possible that such deeply immersive and even “three-
dimensional” environments may come of age soon and become an impor-
tant part of the future of the Web. Johnny Hartz Søraker engages with 
these environments in “Virtual Worlds and Their Challenge to Philoso-
phy: Understanding the ‘Intravirtual’ and the ‘Extravirtual,’ ” where he 
carefully compares and contrasts the kinds of actions possible in these 
worlds (Søraker 2014). This leads one to think that fundamentally the 
Cartesian distinction between the “real world” and the “virtual world” 
may indeed be far more complex than initially conceived, positing a prob-
lematic that may end up being just as important for the philosophy of the 
Web as the mind–body problem is for the philosophy of mind. Far from 
being purely academic, these debates over how the Web interacts with our 
daily life are already stirring upheaval in how we understand our own 
notion of privacy and identity, and will soon perhaps even take political 
center stage.
3.5. The Future of the Philosophy of the Web
In this collection, we have endeavoured to take into full account both the 
engineering aspect and the wider philosophical ramifications of the Web. 
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So we are pleased to feature new pieces from both Tim Berners-Lee and 
Bernard Stiegler on philosophical engineering and the philosophy of the 
Web. We are privileged to include with his permission the text of an inter-
view we did with Berners-Lee, widely acclaimed as the inventor of the Web 
(Halpin and Monnin 2014). In this wide-ranging interview, Berners-Lee 
reveals why he coined the term “philosophical engineering” and offers his 
thoughts on the future of the philosophy of the Web. We end the collec-
tion with an afterword entitled “Web Philosophy” by Bernard Stiegler, 
one of France’s preeminent philosophers of technology, who uncovers the 
potential and the “shadows” at the heart of the digital enlightenment’s 
new political philosophy (Stiegler 2014). Stiegler attempts to place “philo-
sophical engineering” in proper context by uncovering its lineage from 
Archimedes to the Web by way of philosophers such as Plato, Husserl, 
and Derrida.
4. Conclusion
Ultimately, the philosophy of the Web has just begun, and its future is far 
from certain: the impact of the Web may ultimately be as transformative 
as that of natural language, or perhaps it will be superseded within a short 
time by some truly distinct technological development. Regardless, just as 
the study of artificial intelligence provoked genuine philosophical inquiry 
into the nature of mind and intelligence, the philosophy of the Web will 
at least—we hope!—provoke the taking of engineered artifacts such as the 
Web that impinge on areas traditionally the province of philosophy as 
first-class subjects of concerted inquiry by philosophers. The Web has 
obviously benefitted from previous encounters with philosophically 
informed engineers, although this point alone would deserve a more 
ample treatment (Shadbolt 2007).
All these engineering-related activities on the Web can easily be 
described, if one is willing to alter Clausewitz’s adage, as “philosophy con-
tinued through other means.” Most of these means, though, are far from 
being completely exogenic. It is only through a redoubling of awareness 
over these new technological mediations, studied and developed by “philo-
sophical engineering,” that philosophers may have the opportunity to 
extend their categories by submitting them to the evaluation of the non-
human technical artifacts, now regular constituents of our world. The 
stake here is a change of course that has nothing to do with just switching 
one given a priori (or epistēmē) for another. Ian Hacking (2002) sharply 
underlined that such notions are far too massive. We believe that those 
interested in the philosophy of the Web are not simply wearing a new pair 
of conceptual glasses; the world itself has changed, for it is composed no 
longer of canonical entities but of utterly new ones that differ fundamen-
tally from their predecessors. Enriched with the new details bequeathed to 
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it by technology, the world is asking for a redefinition of its ontological 
cartography (perhaps an “ontography”), even if it implies that we should 
broaden our philosophical focus to encompass all the agents responsible 
for the shift to the Web (engineers, languages, standardization committees, 
documents, search engines, policymakers, and the like). No empirical 
metaphysics is entitled to define the “nature,” patterns, or limits of the 
agents that can impact the philosophy of the Web without argumentation 
and clarity. What is at stake, the determination of the “collective,” the 
cosmos we live in, requires that we stay on the verge of philosophy itself, 
on the very technical spot where new objects6 are spreading, and once these 
objects are brought back to their philosophical womb, they will certainly 
foster mutation within philosophy. We consider the Web to be endowed 
with this capacity more than any other technical apparatus, and that the 
duty of the philosophy of the Web is to set ourselves upon the task.
As we have seen, this task leads to a number of open questions, and 
we hope that the contributions to this collection have put forward some 
of these questions as clearly as possible, in order to highlight theoretical 
as well as technological issues—and even social and political matters—
that will set the philosophy of the Web in motion toward the interdisci-
plinary point of view necessary to adequately address these problems. In 
the context of the Web more than ever, neither philosophy nor engineering 
can escape its practical consequences by dodging issues that are relevant, 
and even vital, to how the architects of the Web have in the past engi-
neered and will in the future engineer the Web itself, as it increasingly 
becomes the primary medium of knowledge and communication. Again, 
the traffic is not only one-way between philosophy and the Web, it is a 
dynamic feedback cycle: as the Web itself is mutating as a medium, we 
can consider humans and objects of knowledge to be condemned to 
mutate in turn. Historically, philosophy is a discipline descended from the 
alphabet and the book. Under the influence of what has been called by 
French historian of language Sylvain Auroux a “third revolution of gram-
matization” (Auroux 1994) catalyzed by digital technologies and the Web, 
what turn philosophy takes remains to be seen.
Richard Sennett’s motto in a recent book appears to be “doing is think-
ing” (Sennett 2008); once concepts have been artifactualized (and, as a 
consequence, externalized), thinking is also doing, and so in the end, a 
matter of design. In this regard, we need to reject Marx’s Eleventh Thesis 
on Feuerbach: in the era of the Web, interpreting the world is already 
changing it. This holds true especially when the art of interpretation 
and theorizing is serving the purpose of the creation of new forms of 
technology that harness the power of the Web via building on and creating 
6 Several of these new objects have been minutely examined by other disciplines, and we 
may want to borrow from them. One meaningful example is the analysis of standards as an 
essential tool to understand the Web’s architecture.
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Web standards. These innovations target a reality yet to come, but a 
reality that we can already conceive of, as opposed to a pre-existing reality. 
The matter of engineering the Web is rapidly transforming into the matter 
of engineering the world. To paraphrase Saussure, the philosopher and 
the engineer are both challenged to acquire a clear view of what it is they 
are doing. For the philosophy of the Web and philosophy itself, these are 
the stakes.
Afterword
A few words are necessary in order to provide some context for the recent 
development of the philosophy of the Web that led to this collection, and 
to provide a call for those interested to join in shaping the future of 
the philosophy of the Web. The term “philosophy of the Web” was first 
coined by Halpin (2008), while the central importance of artifactualization 
in the philosophy of the Web was first explicated by Monnin (2009). 
Monnin organized the first Web and Philosophy symposium in 2010 at 
La Sorbonne. Subsequent editions of this symposium were organized 
jointly by Halpin and Monnin in 2011 at Thessaloniki to coincide with 
the conference on the Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence and 
at Lyon in 2012 as a workshop at the International World Wide Web 
Conference. Several of the contributions to this collection are extended 
versions of presentations given at these events, and we would like to thank 
all of those who have participated in the discussion so far. Again, the 
philosophy of the Web is not the static product of a single individual (or 
even two!), but a collective endeavour like the Web itself, whose scope and 
power widens the more that people are involved. To engage in future 
events and public debate, join the W3C Philosophy of the Web Commu-
nity Group: http://www.w3.org/community/philoweb/.
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